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Introduction
There is something about law that makes it appear –at least 
to some- as the pinnacle of stability. Law, it is then often assumed, 
either  expresses  stability,  or  effectuates  it.  Many  of  course  will 
accept insights from conflict sociology that suggest that every single 
piece  of  law or  legislation is  fought  for,  or,  as  the  case  may  be, 
vehemently  resisted.  All  legislation,  claims  conflict  sociology, 
emerges  out  of  conflict  and  struggle.  First  there  is  conflict  and 
struggle. Then there is law. But conflict and struggle will not have 
gone away. Conflict and struggle will continue to generate law –new 
law,  different  law.  That  much  is  understood.  However,  much  in
conflict  sociology  tends  to  subscribe  to the  idea  that  at  the  very 
deep root of law one will find stability, albeit that this stability may 
take  different  forms.  It  could  be  the  stability  of  a  particular 
collective will to mobilize force and transform it into political power. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology Lippens
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Law here is the product of the will of a stable collective. Although 
this collective will be particular –in a world of conflict and struggle, 
it could never be universal- it may decide to use law to express, 
maintain, or  indeed  achieve  its stability.  Law,  standing  in for  the 
universal, may even help to achieve all this by serving as a plane on 
which what has been called hegemony, and corresponding stability,
could  spread.  More  often  than  not  though,  any  such  attempt  at 
achieving hegemony will be in vain. Conflict and struggle being the 
ultimate bed-rock  of  all  societies,  they  are  then  also the  deepest 
form of stability whence law –all law- comes from. All this is well 
understood.
But  there  is  another  way  of  looking  at  law.  Law,  in  this 
alternative perspective, is not so much the result or the source of 
stability,  as the  conduit  for  creativity,  indeed  the  conduit  of
creativity. It is to this alternative reading of law which we will turn 
in this short paper. The argument is built on insights gleaned from 
two  works  in  legal  theory  which,  to  say  the  least,  are  of  very 
significant  importance  to  anyone  who  might  be  interested  in  the 
philosophy of law. The first is Peter Fitzpatrick’s Modernity and the 
Grounds of Law (2000). In his book Fitzpatrick reads law neither as 
stability nor as instability, but as irresolution. But there is an older 
insight into the indeterminacy of law. In his final major work, i.e. 
the one on Les Deux Sources de la Morale et de la Réligion[1932], 
Henri  Bergson locates law firmly and squarely in the openness of Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology Lippens
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the  human  condition.  Although  Bergson,  in  this  book, is  formally 
concerned  with  ‘morality’  and  ‘religion’,  his  argument  is  certainly 
applicable  to  law.  Law,  according  to  Bergson,  emerges  out  of 
openness, and law leads back to it.
Law as the Interstitial
What  is  the  ground  of  law? On  what  does  law rest?  Where 
does  law  come  from?  These  are  Fitzpatrick’s  basic  questions.  A 
close  reading  of  Freud’s  Totem  and  Taboo (1913)  brings  him  to 
formulate  an  answer  to  these  questions.  In  Freud’s  text,  the 
members of the primordial horde who live under the savage rule of 
an all powerful authoritarian ruler eventually decide to kill the latter. 
Afterwards, that is, after the loss of that which constituted them, 
they feel remorse. In their remorse they institute the first form of 
law,  i.e.  totemic  law,  whereby  the  slain  savage  ruler is  replaced 
with  the  totem.  One  could  then  argue  that  the  ground  of  law  is 
determinacy,  i.e.  the  determination,  of  the horde,  to  kill  the 
primordial  ruler.  Seen  from  this  perspective law  flows  from 
determination,  from  something  determinate within  the  primordial 
horde that made them decide something collectively. The newness
which law brings is determined newness. However, one could also 
argue that law, in Freud’s text, emerges out of indeterminacy. The 
indeterminacy which is referred to here is the indeterminacy within 
the  primordial  horde before  the  moment  of  decision.  The  horde’s Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology Lippens
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decision  –their  determination- emerged  out  of  this  very 
indeterminacy. If there hadn’t been indeterminacy in the horde prior 
to  their  decision,  if  everything  had  been  determined,  their  very 
determination to kill the ruler, and then to institute law, would have 
been impossible. The horde’s intention to kill, their determination to 
law, emerges here from openness. Law, in this perspective, flows 
from indeterminacy. The newness which law brings is indeterminate 
newness. 
Now, Fitzpatrick locates law in the interstitial space between 
determinacy  and  indeterminacy.  Law,  he  argues,  is  the space  of 
‘irresolution’ between on the one hand determination, and, on the 
other,  responsiveness (2000:  16-20,  36,  68,  72-72).  Law  could 
never emerge out of utter, total determination (nothing could ever 
come out of that). But law (or anything else for that matter) could 
never  emerge  from  utter,  total  responsiveness  either.  Total 
responsiveness, if there were such a thing, could never be able to 
generate  anything.  It  would  lose  itself  in  total  responsiveness. 
Complexity theorists would probably say that law emerges, not out 
of chaos, nor from the complete absence of chaos, but at the edge 
of chaos.
Law  is  also  the  interstitial  space  between  continuity  and 
rupture.  To  illustrate  this:  savage  rule  persists  in  (post-)  totemic
law,  but  the  latter  also  represents  a  clear  break  with  or  rupture 
from the original savage rule of the authoritarian ruler. Law, then, Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology Lippens
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flows from the interstitial, or from ‘irresolution’, and flows back into 
it. Law, says Fitzpatrick, is this interstitial space. The determinacy in 
and  of  law  originates  in  its responsiveness.  And  the  reverse  also 
holds: law’s responsiveness originates in its determinacy. Law could 
never  originate  in  absolute  determination.  Absolute  determination 
could never generate anything. It could never determine anything. 
Nor could absolute responsiveness ever generate anything (it could 
never  be  responsive,  for  there  would  be  nothing  to  draw 
responsiveness  from).  Only  the  interstitial  irresolution  between 
determination and responsiveness can.
Another way of looking at this is to consider law as the “mute 
ground”  on  which  social  combinations  are  made (2000:  88).  The 
social  is  the  realm  of  social  combination.  Social combinations  are 
combinations  whereby  entities  combine,  that  is,  whereby  entities 
are included/excluded (with inclusion depending on exclusion, and 
vice  versa).  Law,  as  an  interstitial  space,  generates  such 
combinations.  Social  combinations,  then,  are  produced  by  law’s 
“mute”  interstitiality,  rather  than the other  way  round (i.e. social 
combinations producing law). The emergence of totemic law could 
represent  the  birth  of  human  ‘society’.  ‘Society’  here  includes  all 
those who adhere to the totem, and excludes all savages who don’t. 
Now,  this  ‘society’  originates  in  the  interstitial  space  between 
determination  and  responsiveness.  The  totemic  law  (or  ‘society’), 
then, is  born  in  the  interstitial  space  between  totally  responsive Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology Lippens
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savage  rule  and  the  fully,  totally  determined  horde.  That  is  the 
space of law. 
The birth of law, it could then be argued, is also the birth of 
human ‘society’. The emergence of law, the emergence of human 
‘society’ –why not call it the birth of the human condition- coincides 
with the emergence of the interstitial. We will explore this point in 
the remainder of this contribution. But allow us to repeat and stress 
a  few  more  words  on  the  interstitial  first.  The  emergence  of  the 
human condition on the one hand constitutes a rupture with what 
went  before,  i.e.  savage  rule.  The  irresolution  of  law  and  the 
unstoppable diversity of social combinations which this irresolution 
generates  in a way  are  a clean break  from savagery. But on the 
other hand this emergence of the human condition –to repeat: the 
condition of irresolute law and resulting social combination- is also a 
continuation of what went before. The brutal savagery of violence is 
still present in all human law and social combination. In Nietzschean 
terms: the will to power in human life is still ... will to power. The 
human herd is still.... a herd (see e.g. Nietzsche’s autobiographical 
Ecce Homo, 1908).
Law as Fabulation
Bergson had  an interesting view on law and  its place in  an 
emerging  human  condition.  Although  Fitzpatrick  did  not  analyse 
Bergson’s  work  for  his  book  on  the  interstitial,  we  believe  it is Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology Lippens
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worthwhile to have a closer look at this work. Bergson saw law not 
so  much  as an  interstitial  space,  but,  rather,  as a  filling of
interstitial  space,  as that  which bridges the irresolute  space 
between  determination  and  responsiveness.  He  considered  law to 
be the most fundamental  product of the human condition, which, 
itself, emerged from the workings of the ‘élan vital’. This ‘élan vital’, 
or  life  force,  is  the  fuel  of  all  life  (not  just  human  life)  and,  like 
Nietzsche’s concept of will to power, it connects the rupture of the 
emerging human to the continuity of the non-human. In the human 
condition  though  the  ‘élan  vital’  constantly  and incessantly  takes 
human  being  beyond  itself.  Human  being  –Bergson  agrees  here 
with  e.g.  Nietzsche,  whom  he  rarely  mentions- is  becoming, 
unrelenting  becoming.  That  which  causes,  prompts  and  fuels 
becoming in human being (or in human beings), is the ‘élan vital’.
Human being  emerged,  or  emerges, at the point  where the ‘élan 
vital’ takes being beyond itself, beyond its ‘in-itself’.
Human beings have the capacity to imagine the world around 
them  as  it  could  be,  or  as  it  could  have  been.  Human  beings 
imagine that which is not. They have the capacity to imagine that 
which might be, or should be. They have the capacity to imagine a 
world beyond its “in-itself”. This capacity also includes the capacity 
to  imagine  future.  Human  beings  have  the  capacity  to  imagine
themselves as  they  could  be.  They  have  the  capacity  to imagine 
their  own  future.  They  can  look  at  themselves  and  imagine that Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology Lippens
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which  they  are  not,  or  that  which  they  are  not  yet.  All  this  is 
common ground with existentialist thought (to which we will return 
below).  It  pays  to  have  a  closer  look  at  this  capacity,  i.e. 
imagination.  Human  beings  imagine  a  distance  between  what  is, 
and what is not (e.g. what could be, what should be, and so on). 
This distance lends a certain goal-orientedness to human being, and 
makes  e.g.  technology  possible (Bergson,  1932:  105  ff.).  The 
human  condition,  also according  to  Bergson,  is  a  technological 
condition. But the imagined distance between what is and what is 
not  also  implies  openness,  indeterminacy,  uncertainty,  and 
ultimately,  insecurity.  This  is  why  imagination,  in  the  very  same 
moment of imagining distance, will also, and simultaneously so, fill 
in  the  imagined  distance  with  imagination  (Bergson  says:  with 
fabulation,  1932:  111)  so  as  to  provide  at  least  a  semblance  of 
closure,  determinacy,  certainty,  and  security.  That  which  is  thus 
fabulated is a technological code in the sense that it bridges that 
which is and that which is not (yet).
But where does this human capacity to imagine and fabulate 
come from? It is the effect of the ‘élan vital’ which, in human being, 
or  in  human  beings,  opens  up being  by  taking  it  beyond  its  “in-
itself”, and which then fills it again with being (i.e. with fabulation, 
or  with  fabulations).  These  fabulations  will  of  course  immediately 
add  to  the  “in-itself”  of  being.  That  means that  they  also  will be 
available  for  the  ‘élan  vital’  to  crack  open, again  an  again, e.g. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology Lippens
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when  a mismatch  is  experienced  between ‘goal’  and  ‘technology’.
When  that  happens  –and  it  happens  incessantly- this  ‘cracking 
open’ will once again generate an imagined distance beyond the “in-
itself”, and will once again fill it with yet further fabulation. And so 
on. This process  is inevitable  and  unstoppable,  since, as  Bergson 
had  argued  before  in  his  seminal  Creative  Evolution  (originally 
published  in  French  in  1907,  translated  in  1911),  no  product  of 
human intelligence could ever grasp the near infinite multiplicity of 
human life (but all life is infinitely complex change or duration). As 
mere products of human intelligence, ‘fabulations’ could never grasp 
life’s  duration.  All  fabulation,  then,  for  all  its  technological  goal-
orientedness, is bound to fall short of its basic aim, i.e. to provide 
closure, determinacy, certainty, and security. Fabulation is a never-
ending story.   
However, fabulation is the source of moral, religious and legal 
code. Indeed, in primitive societies, claims Bergson (1932: 162 ff), 
the  most  fundamental  fabulations  took  the  shape  of  animistic 
entities (or spirits) which filled the imagined distance between what 
is and what is not (yet). Spirits were fabulated as totemic idols, in
religious  ritual,  as  legal  obligation  to  obey,  and  as  scientific 
explanation.  In  primitive  societies  all  these  spheres  were 
undifferentiated. The source of law, then, is to be found in this very 
moment  of  fabulation.  Law,  as  technological  code, dwells  at  the 
heart of fabulation. As fabulation, as technological code, it bridges Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology Lippens
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the imagined distance between what is, and that which is not (yet). 
Law  promises closure,  determinacy,  certainty,  and  even  security, 
but  is,  at  the  same  time,  shot  through  with  the  openness, 
indeterminacy, uncertainty and insecurity of the imagined distance 
whence  it  came. Law,  to  use  Fitzpatrick’s  words,  is  an  interstitial 
space.  If  law  is  the  irresolution  between  determinacy  and 
responsiveness, it is also this irresolution which generates a variety 
of  social  combinations.  As a  fabulated  and  responsive  piece  of 
technology,  law’s  fabulated  determinacy  fills  in and  results  from
imagined indeterminacy. Its fabulated determinacy is then, indeed, 
going  to  be  shot  through  with  indeterminacy.  That  ‘internal’ 
indeterminacy  (i.e.  the  indeterminacy  within  law)  is  the  point  at 
which  the  ‘élan  vital’  will  then  again,  and  again,  unsettle  the 
determinacy  of  law (i.e.  make  it  respond,  in  yet  another  bout  of 
fabulation, to the distances thrown up by the ‘élan vital’).  
The  ‘élan  vital’,  when it  strikes  human  being,  and  when  it 
opens it up (it does so incessantly), is creative (again this is a point 
first explored in depth in Bergson’s Creative Evolution). To fabulate 
is to be human; it is to be creative. That which is human, fabulates 
(creatively). That which fabulates creates what is human. The ‘élan 
vital’  creates  indeterminacy  in  determinacy,  and  it  creates
determinacy  in  indeterminacy.  To  use  Bergson’s  own  words:  it 
creates  openness  in  closure,  and  it  creates  closure  in  openness
(1932: 57-63). All this happens simultaneously. Once could say, to Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology Lippens
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use Sartre’s existentialist language, that the ‘élan vital’, in human 
being, creates “nothingness” (i.e. distance) in being, while it creates 
‘being’ (in the shape of fabulation) in nothingness. But I hasten to 
add  here  that  Bergson  would  probably  have  disagreed  here  if  he 
had  lived  to  read  Sartre’s  Being  and  Nothingness,  1943.  Like  his 
modern day disciples (e.g. Gilles Deleuze) could not accommodate 
the idea of the void, of absolute “nothingness” out of which radical 
freedom and choice, according to Sartre, well up. All freedom and
all choice, in Bergson’s view (and Deleuze’s, for that matter), is a 
mere effect of the infinitely complex workings of the élan vital’ as it 
traverses  matter.  Freedom  and  choice,  in  other  words,  are  mere 
effects of duration. There is no void. There is no nothingness (this is 
a point criticized by philosophers such as Alain Badiou, e.g. 2000: 
89-91).     
Law as Image
It  could  not  be  denied  that  Bergson’s  basic  position  on  law 
(“morality  and  religion”)  is  functionalist.  He  defines  religion  and 
morality (or code, if we extrapolate) as “une réaction défensive de 
la  nature  contre  ce  qu’il  pourrait  y  avoir  de  déprimant  pour 
l’individu,  et  de  dissolvant  pour  la  société,  dans  l’exercice  de 
l’intelligence” [nature’s defensive reaction against that which might 
be  depressing  for  individuals, and  dissolving  for  society,  in  the 
workings of intelligence] (1932: 211). But it is a functionalism of Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology Lippens
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sorts. To see this, we will have to have a closer look at Bergson’s 
notion of ‘intelligence’. But first we need to focus once more on the 
creative dimension of the ‘élan vital’ in human being.
The  ‘élan  vital’  is  necessarily  creative  in  that  it  creates
distance  between  what  is  and  what  is  not  (yet), whilst  it 
simultaneously  creates  fabulations  (of  which  law,  or  technological 
code more generally, is the fundamental form) that fill the distance. 
In doing that, it creatively takes human being, time and time again, 
beyond  itself. In most  cases though, this creativity  is only quasi-
creativity. That which is fabulated only constitutes a re-combination 
of  social  assemblages or  combinations within  the  space  of  an 
already  existing  code.  In  other  words:  that  which  is  fabulated 
merely represents a mere reshuffling of an existing deck of social 
cards  (or  arrangements).  In  most  cases  fabulation  does  not 
generate fundamentally new arrangements. It very rarely leads to 
the  creation  of  fundamentally  new  codes,  that  is,  fundamentally 
new forms of life. In other words, fabulation in most cases only re-
arranges combinations in the extensive sphere -i.e. in the sphere of 
the  actual- not  in  the  intensive sphere, i.e.  the  sphere  of  the 
potential, or virtual (1932: 247-253). Typical here are processes of 
attempted  universalization,  whereby  efforts  are  made  to
universalize  particular  codes,  e.g.  in  the  fabulated  belief  that  the 
fully human resides in the universal. Such attempts are doomed to 
fail,  since,  of  course,  all  social  combinations  rest  upon  exclusion, Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology Lippens
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including those that aim for universal inclusion –indeed particularly
those  that  aim  for  universal  inclusion.  Authors  such  as  Zygmunt 
Bauman would later expand on this in the claim that “order is not 
universalizable” (1993: 8-15; 212). 
However,  creation  of  the  really new  is,  in  human  being, 
certainly possible. Real creativity is creativity that takes place in the 
intensive sphere, in the sphere of pure, no-yet-actualized potential. 
There, intensities may recombine, thus generating new forms of life 
which are built around new codes. This process of recombination is 
first a virtual process. The newly emerging form of life emerges first 
virtually, before it then actualizes in the extensive sphere, i.e. in the 
sphere of the actual. Bergson’s focus on the role of the virtual in the 
creation, by the ‘élan vital’, of the new, was later adopted by Gilles 
Deleuze and Félix Guattari in their double volume  on Anti-Oedipe 
(1972) and Mille Plateaux (1980). In his book on Foucault (1988: 
36-37) Deleuze would call the virtual moment of emergent forms of 
life  “diagrammes”.  Once  formed (rhizomatically,  one  might  add)
these  diagrammes  then  traverse  the  actual  (matter,  bodies, 
fabulations, institutions, language, and so on), where they will clash 
with  the  codes  that  are  embedded  in  the  already  existing,  and 
where they will undergo, in this very clash, an unavoidable amount 
of  transformation  and  modification.  Ultimately  though  they  may
generate, in the actual, combinations and re-combinations in which 
some  of  the  new  may  then  shine  through (Jamie  Murray  has Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology Lippens
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recently published two very fine papers on the topic of Deleuzean 
emergence; see Murray 2006 and 2007). 
The crucial question now is: who, or what, creates? One way 
of answering that question would be to simply say: the ‘élan vital’ 
does.  As said above: the duration of life is full; infinitely complex 
and interconnected, and changing incessantly, but full. There is no 
void in life. Life knows no “nothingness”. There is then no reason to 
assume a role for subjectivity in creation. Subjectivity, Bergsonians 
and Deleuzeans might argue, is a mere effect of the creativity of, or
in, intensive life itself. Subjectivity is itself a mere effect of the ‘élan 
vital’.
But there  is another  way of looking at this question.  In his 
book  on  L’Imagination [1936]  Jean-Paul  Sartre  critically  analyzes 
theories and models of imagination, including Bergson’s. Strangely, 
he  did  not  study  the  latter’s  book  on  Les  Deux  Sources though, 
which had been published only a few years before (we will later see 
that  his  argument may  therefore  have  been  slightly  unfair  to 
Bergson).  Sartre  uses  Husserl’s  notion  of  intentionality to  oppose 
any conception of imagination as the mere intensive combination, 
or re-combination, within duration, of  a particular kind  of  objects 
(i.e. images). On the contrary, Sartre claims, “L’image est un acte 
et non une chose. L’image est conscience de quelque chose” (1936: 
162]. In  other  words:  the  image  is  an  act by  something  that  is 
intentionally  linked, through consciousness, to  a particular object. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology Lippens
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That  ‘something’ is  the  subject.  Whether  or  not  the  subject  is  a 
mere effect of the life force or ‘élan vital’ is irrelevant. The issue is 
to recognize that images are actions. Actions are intentional. They 
are what intentional singularities do. The image is intentional action
by  intentional  singularities  (call  them  subject,  the  self,  etc). 
Whether they are mere effects of the ‘élan vital’ or not, intentional 
singularities exist. They act. They do things, intentionally. And they 
have  an  impact.  They  are  important,  indeed  crucial,  to  the 
understanding of the emergence of law. If it wasn’t for the actions 
of intentional singularities, the new (or law, or code more generally) 
would never get to be imagined in the first place. Human being is 
singular. Yes,  one may hold  the idea,  with Deleuze  and Guattari,
that  the  subject,  or  the  self,  is  rhizomatically  multiple,  and 
rhizomatically intertwined with its actual outside and with the much 
deeper reservoir of intensive potential. But the “nothingness” inside 
it (Sartre, 1943, of course), that is, the distance within it between 
its “in-itself” and its “for-itself” (Sartre, 2003: 637), has a singular 
shape. Like its multiplicity, its internal nothingness is singular; ever-
changing and transforming, yes, but singular nevertheless. 
One  may  of  course  choose  to  ignore  Sartre’s 
phenomenological point. But in a way Bergson himself, in his Les 
Deux Sources, already felt that he had to be more specific on the 
issue of subjectivity. He  never uses  the word  though. Instead he 
uses “intelligence” and “genius” (1932: 56-85). The ‘élan vital’, in Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology Lippens
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human being, generates images of newness through “intelligence” 
and “genius”, and those –although Bergson remains silent on this 
issue- must then  be  singular.  ‘Intelligence’  is  about  conceptual 
contemplation and assemblage, and thus it (i.e. intelligence) usually 
deals  with  extensive  materials  (matter,  social  arrangements, 
language,  concepts,  ideas,  and  so  on).  But  ‘intelligence’  also 
integrates  “l’infra-intellectuel”  (habit,  routine,  nature  an-sich,  and 
so  on)  and “le  supra-intellectuel”  (“aspiration,  intuition,  and 
emotion”) which are “indéfiniment résolubles en idées” (1932: 85). 
Genius  is  the  soul  (“l’âme”)  that  manages  or  conducts  such 
integration through a movement which, in abandoning all existing 
code,  mystically (Bergson’s  word)  explores  human  being’s  “très 
grand corps inorganique”, that is, “le lieu de nos actions éventuelles 
et  théoriquement possibles”  (1932:  275). The  notion of the  Body 
without Organs may come to mind here to Deleuzeans. The soul of 
genius, in other words, is the soul that opens up to, withdraws into, 
and  subsequently  explores,  the  non-organic,  non-organized,  un-
coded zone of pure intensive potential (the “theoretically possible”). 
The only way for such a soul to be able to do that, and to creatively 
allow the new to emerge (Sartre would say: to creatively imagine 
the new), then, is to actively and indeed intentionally withdraw from 
all  existing  code. There  is  a  paradox  involved  here:  it  takes 
singularities  who  intentionally  withdraw  from  the  extensive  –and 
therefore  also  from  their  very  singularity- for  real  creativity  to Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology Lippens
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emerge. In other words, wherever and whenever singularities will 
not  intentionally  withdraw  from  the  codes  embedded  in  the 
extensive  actual in  order  to  mystically explore  yet-unrealised 
potential in the sphere of the intensive, new forms of life, new law, 
or simply  newness  will  not  emerge.  Only  combinations  and  re-
combinations in the sphere of the extensive actual, and within the 
bounds  of  codes  embedded  in  the  already  existing,  will  then  be 
possible.
Law, or code, more generally, in a Bergsonian view, emerges
first as  image.  With  Sartre’s  phenomenology  (or  existentialism) 
added to it, it emerges as action (as fabulated image, to be precise) 
in  and  through the  operations  of  singularities  whereby  virtual 
assemblages of intensities are ‘allowed’ (they are ‘allowed’ this by 
intentional singularities or ‘selves’ that decide to withdraw from all 
actualized code) to traverse the sphere of the extensive when they 
actualize. A pure Bergsonian (and Deleuzean) view here would hold
that this act of ‘allowing’ is fully part and parcel of the workings of 
duration, and of the ‘élan vital’ itself. In a Sartrean-inspired view 
this  ‘allowing’  refers  to  a  decision  made  by  a  singular  self  built 
around a void (the location of radical freedom and choice) struck, in 
human  being,  by  the  workings  of  the  ‘élan  vital’. In  this  view, 
whichever combinations of intensities take place in the virtual, for 
their emerging code to actualize in the extensive, the operation of 
intentional singularities is crucial. This operation is imagination. It isJournal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology Lippens
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human imagination, to use a pleonasm. ‘Genius’ is the name which 
Bergson gave to the capacity to imagine the really new, that is (in 
Bergson’s view): the capacity to withdraw from all extensive code 
and  to  directly  tap  into  the  sphere  of  the  intensive  which  is  the 
sphere of duration, of the ‘élan vital’ itself. 
Law, then, begins its life as image. One may take all this quite 
literally. The code of newly emerging forms of life –or law, if you 
wish- tends to actualize first as image, or in image, before it does 
so conceptually, that is, in the extensive world of language. It would 
take us too far to develop this point here though (please refer to 
Lippens 2009, 2011a and 2011b for elaborations on this).  
Conclusion
Many  criminologists  have  had  a  longstanding  interest  in 
processes of criminalization. Criminologists (or sociologists, for that 
matter) would be able to analyse and even explain the origins and 
genesis  of  such  pieces  of  legislation.  It  was  not  our  intention  to 
rehearse the many sociological models and perspectives that have 
been  devised  to  get  to  grips  with  processes  of  criminalization. 
However,  one  might  perhaps  be  forgiven  for  thinking  that  the 
common thread in many of those models and perspectives is that 
law is the result of the struggle and conflict within and between sets 
of social assemblages or combinations. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology Lippens
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The point we have been trying to make here is that one could 
also  look  at  the  question  of  criminalization from  a  more 
philosophical point of view. In this essay we focussed on writings by 
Henri  Bergson  [1932]  and  Peter  Fitzpatrick  (2000)  on  the 
emergence  of  law.  It  became  clear  to  us  that  law  is  not  just  a 
matter  of  combining  and  re-combining  extensive  social 
arrangements (although of course we now hasten to add that it is 
that also). Law  is,  in  a  way,  more  fundamental  than  social 
combinations  or  assemblages.  At  a  more  fundamental  level  law 
seems to be a technological code that begins its life as fabulated 
image.  As  fabulated  image  though,  it  is  shot  through  with  the 
openness  and indeterminacy of its interstitial origins. That  means 
that  another law,  another  code,  another form  of  life,  are always 
possible,  even  beyond  the  mere  re-arrangement  of  extensive 
assemblages and combinations. It only takes a while, and mystical
singularities (Bergson’s word again), for newness to emerge.   
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